Pensions under pressure by Doug Campbell
W
est Virginia is famous for
its spectacular mountains,
ample mineral deposits,
and its spirit of independence. But the
Mountain State is known for all the
wrong reasons when it comes to its
public pension system. West Virginia 
is home to the nation’s worst-
funded major retirement plan for state
and local government employees.
Specifically, its main fund for teachers
faces an estimated shortfall of almost
$5 billion, holding only 25 percent of
the financial assets deemed necessary
to pay for the promised retirement
packages of about 46,000 workers.
How did this happen? While many
economic factors could contribute to
the situation, at its heart pension man-
agement suffers from a fundamental
mismatch between authority and
accountability. Administrators of pub-
lic pension plans make decisions for
which their accountability could be
limited, because the consequences of
their decisions happen so far in the
future. Economists argue that this
problem is a form of “moral hazard.”
Dan Foster, who is the current
chairman of the West Virginia Senate’s
Pensions Committee, has a succinct
explanation for what happened with
the teachers’ plan: “We did not fund it
as we should have. And at the same
time, the benefits that were given to
state retirees and teachers for this 
program were continuing to increase
for political reasons. We are dealing
with election cycles which tend to be a
lot shorter than these financial cycles,
so legislatures tended not to worry
about what would happen 10 or 20
years in the future.”
To crawl out of this hole, West
Virginia in 2000 tried to float a $3.9
billion obligation bond, only to have it
blocked because a court said it needed
voter approval. A $5.5 billion bond got
on the ballot last summer but failed.
Now, the state is relying on a 40-year
plan, begun in 1994, to slowly close the
gap with regular payments. Meanwhile,
the teachers’ fund was closed to new
hires for several years, though it has
since been reopened.
While pension administrators —
both public and private — generally
may face the temptation to inade-
quately fund future obligations, not all
plans are in trouble. For example,
North Carolina suffers no such 
pension woes. Its system, which
encompasses almost 600,000 workers
and retirees, has a $3.4 billion surplus.
When watchdog groups express 
concern about public pensions, they
never bring up North Carolina.
Just the same, public pension critics
have plenty of ammunition. From West
Virginia to Illinois, many governments
are struggling to shore up their public
pension systems. Granted, some of
these cases may not be primarily due to
accountability problems. Since funding
of public pensions is largely dependent
on private sector employment — and
the taxes they generate — it’s possible
that actuarial assumptions could be
thrown off in states where growth in
public-sector employment has 
outflanked the private sector. But in
the case of West Virginia, at least, that
doesn’t appear to be the main problem.
A lot of the debate over what to do
— if anything — about public pensions
centers on whether to shift responsi-
bility for retirement saving from
governments to employees. Like the
debate over Social Security, this one
turns on public opinion about the 
merits of an “ownership society” versus
the seeming safety associated with
state provision of benefits. Beyond the
political debate, though, lies a straight-
forward economic observation:
Despite some recent reforms, 
policymakers face a powerful 
temptation to borrow from, or put off
contributions to, public pensions to
cover spending on other projects.
From Perk to Problem
Not so long ago, retirement in the
United States was nothing more than
the last few, declining years of life, 
usually spent dependent on children.
In 1880, almost eight in 10 men over
the age of 65 still worked; by 2000, the
rate had fallen to less than two in 10.
Now, retirement is “an extended period
of self-financed independence and
leisure,” as economic historian Joanna
Short puts it. There are many factors
contributing to this trend, including
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Nincreased personal incomes and 
affordability of leisure pursuits, plus
advances in health care that help 
people enjoy more active old ages. But
also playing a central role was the
development of Social Security and
pension programs. Increased wealth
made possible all the other factors 
creating longer retirements.
The first public pension in the
United States was set up in 1781 for 
military members. The first pension
plan for state or local government
workers was established by New York
City for police officers in 1878.
Eventually, these plans became the
norm, encompassing teachers, 
firefighters, sanitation workers, 
subway drivers, court clerks, and 
sheriffs’ deputies, among others.
Today, the United States is home to
about 2,600 public-sector pension
plans covering some 20 million active
and retired state and local government
employees. In all, these plans are obli-
gated to pay an estimated $2.4 trillion
(in present value dollars) to their 
beneficiaries. About 90 percent of
state and government employees are
covered by “defined benefit” plans,
compared with less than 25 percent in
the private sector. In general, the 
private sector has been moving away
from defined benefit plans.
Basically, a defined benefit plan
provides an annuity at retirement that
people can’t outlive: Work a certain
number of years, and then collect a
percentage of your salary until you die.
Its assets are professionally managed
and the employer bears most or all of
the investment risk.
There are subtle deviations from
this central premise. Benefits in such
plans usually are calculated according
to a formula based on years of service
and percentage of pay. Sometimes
employees are required to contribute
to their employers’ pension plan,
sometimes not. Sometimes employees
also are opted into the Social Security
system and their paychecks taxed
accordingly, sometimes not. But 
overall, it’s a great deal for employees.
A possible exception, of course, are
employees of private companies that
later encounter financial trouble and
renege on their pension promises.
The backlash against public pen-
sions really began to pick up steam just
five years ago. When the stock market
was roaring in the late 1990s, many
governments pared back their pension
contributions, using the unexpected
gains on their investments to cover the
difference. (Most pension systems
invest assets in a variety of securities,
ranging from stocks to government
bonds.) But then came the market
retreat of 2000 and 2001, and pension
plans that had looked in good shape
suddenly needed help, their rosy 8 percent
investment return estimates way off.
“We experienced a bit of a perfect
storm in terms of the confluence of
events,” says Keith Brainard, research
director with the National Association
of State Retirement Administrators
(NASRA).
These squeezes sometimes force
governments to cut back on services. 
A school district in Michigan, for
example, had eliminated teachers and
halted new textbook purchases as it
tried to meet its pension obligations,
according to a BusinessWeek cover story
last summer.
Funding Crisis?
At present, state and local government
pensions have on average enough to
pay between 84 percent to 88 percent
of what they owe, depending on which
survey you look at. According to 
actuarial standards, anything above 
80 percent is considered sufficiently
funded. Almost one in three plans falls
below the 80 percent threshold.
Nationwide, only two states (North
Carolina and Florida) have total 
pension system assets greater than 
liabilities. (See chart for conditions of
Fifth District public pensions.)
In one of the nation’s most compre-
hensive annual surveys, the Wisconsin
Legislative Council looked at 85 
pension plans in all 50 states, or about
three-quarters of all public-sector
employees covered by pension plans.
The survey found that the number of
plans with funding ratios topping 100
percent fell from 33 to nine between
2000 and 2004. The same study found
a general trend toward improving 
benefits, such as allowing earlier retire-
ments and increasing multiplier
formulas for determining benefits.
These actions yield long-term effects;
by law, once employees are awarded
benefit levels, those levels cannot be
reduced. Only new employees are
affected when lawmakers move to
reduce benefit levels.
To some analysts, these statistics
provide ample evidence that pensions
are particularly vulnerable to poor
management. The reason that many
pensions are dangerously underfunded,
the reasoning goes, isn’t because of
unexpected drops in the stock market.
It’s that pension managers and politi-
cians had no incentive to ever consider
the possibility that investment returns
would falter. Even defenders of public
pensions acknowledge this inherent
disconnect. “They made a lot of prom-
ises during those (bull market) periods
thinking that the high equity values
and the high discount rates would
enable them to pay off those promises
without too much pain,” says Douglas
Elliot, president of the Center on
Federal Financial Institutions, a non-
profit policy institute in Washington,
D.C., that monitors federal govern-
ment lending and insurance activities.
“It looks a lot more painful now.”
The Reason Foundation, a think
tank based in Los Angeles, published a
paper in 2005 titled “The Gathering
Pension Storm: How Government
Pension Plans Are Breaking the Bank,”
which cited myriad ways public 
pensions have been exploited.
“Pension spiking” refers to the practice
of employees who manipulate the sys-
tem to make their compensation as
high as possible just before retirement,
the result being that their pension 
benefits — which are tied to their final
compensation — also rise. Then there
are the so-called “Drop” plans, in
which senior employees amass a special
fund filled with proceeds they would
have gained if they had retired, and
then get to cash it out upon their real
retirement. Sometimes senior employ-
ees face incentives to take advantage of
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considering retiring or not.
“There are strong political 
incentives to increase benefits and
push off obligations into the future,”
says Adam Summers, a Reason
Foundation policy analyst. The most
oft-proposed remedy is a wholesale
shift from defined benefit to defined
contribution plans. This is already 
happening in the private sector, where
the number of defined benefit plans
has fallen 70 percent since 1985 while
defined contribution plans have grown
by almost 50 percent.
A defined contribution plan has
become more broadly known as a
401(k). Such plans don’t guarantee 
benefits but rely on regular contribu-
tions from both employees and
employers to build tax-deferred nest
eggs that are usually dispersed in lump
sums upon retirement. All the risk
resides on the shoulders of employees,
which in the case of public pensions
means that governments — and by
extension, taxpayers — are off the
hook. On the flip side, all the control
over investments goes to employees.
This can be a positive in the sense that
you would expect defined contribution
members to take more care in planning
for their financial futures because of
their strong incentives to do so.
Summers disputes the notion that
governments need defined benefit
plans as a recruiting tool for the best
employees. Private-sector workers
make an average $16.71 an hour; their
public-sector counterparts earn $23.52.
It’s true that there is a higher percent-
age of white-collar professionals in the
public sector, in particular teachers,
which raises the average among gov-
ernment workers. But even among
comparable professional positions,
government workers still make a hair
more than private-sector workers.
Moreover, the recruiting virtues of
defined benefit plans are uncertain.
While it’s true that government workers
with 20 years or more of service are
grateful to have their retirements 
virtually all paid for, a defined 
benefit plan might not be so useful a
recruiting tool for young workers. To a
20-something professional, who is
likely to switch jobs several times in his
career, a portable, defined contribu-
tion plan makes a lot more sense. Some
public systems offer both defined 
benefit and defined contribution plans.
In a recent paper, the National
Association of State Retirement
Administrators responded, saying the
Reason study was “based on a distorted
picture of the public pension funding
situation.” While acknowledging that
administrators face incentives which
could lead them to underfund future
obligations, NASRA’s Brainard argued
that legislation can cure most public
pension ills. He pointed to Georgia as
an example of a state that has passed
strict standards aimed at ensuring that
public pensions remain solvent. In
principle, Brainard accepts the argu-
ment that there is a disconnect
between who authorizes funding for
public pensions and who ultimately is
accountable for making sure the
money is there when needed. “The
‘moral hazard’ argument is definitely
valid,” Brainard says. “But to me, it’s
less to do with the inherent nature of a
defined benefit plan and more to do
with the way it’s established and imple-
mented.”
Success in North Carolina
North Carolina is as good an example
as any of a state where defined benefit
plans haven’t wreaked fiscal havoc.
“When people talk about defined ben-
efit plans, if any one of the pieces of
the puzzle is missing, it can be a recipe
for disaster,” says Richard Moore, the
state’s treasurer. “We are as a state
reaping the benefits of having a prop-
erly endowed and mature pension
fund.”
North Carolina, unlike a lot of
other state pension plans, requires
employees to contribute — the state
takes 6 percent out of every paycheck
before making its contribution.
Granted, the state’s contributions can
change year by year. For example,
North Carolina was putting less than 4
percent of payroll and as little as zero
during the bull run of the late 1990s,
Pension Plight
West Virginia’s pension plan for teachers has the worst funding ratio among major public-sector plans in the nation; North Carolina's public
employee plan is among the best-funded.
Plan Funding Ratio (%) Assets ($000s) Unfunded Liability ($000s)
District of Columbia Teachers 100.0 1,917,800 –   
District of Columbia Police & Fire 100.0 1,427,800 –   
Maryland Teachers 92.8 20,155,415  1,568,763 
North Carolina Teachers and State Employee 108.1 45,117,508  (3,383,806)
North Carolina Local Government 99.3 12,364,380  91,124 
South Carolina Retirement System 82.8 20,197,936  4,200,995 
Virginia Retirement System 96.4 39,243,000  1,455,000 
West Virginia Public Employee Retirement System 80.0 3,095,660  774,541 
West Virginia Teachers 22.2 1,427,475  5,013,263 
NOTE: Figures as of 6/30/04 except D.C., 9/30/04.
SOURCE: National Association of State Retirement Administrators
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reversed course as the market soured.
Meanwhile, its expectations about
the future are decidedly conservative,
most years assuming returns of 7.25
percent. (In the Wisconsin Legislative
Council’s survey, North Carolina’s
return estimate was tied for second
lowest with South Carolina among 85
major public pension plans.)
Additionally, North Carolina govern-
ment employees pay into the Social
Security system, and are promised only
about half of their top salary after even
30 years of service — generous but not
in league with plans that offer 
75 percent to 95 percent of their top
salaries. “We have worked very hard to
keep all of our expectations and
assumptions realistic in North
Carolina,” Moore says. “That’s why
we’re in such great shape.”
Also, Moore says it’s cheaper to
manage a defined benefit plan. His
office spends 10 basis points per total
assets on managing the fund, 
compared with about 70 basis points
for a defined contribution plan. And
investment returns tend to be higher,
Moore says, thanks to the state’s
investment strategy that is strict in its
adherence to asset allocation, unlike
how many individuals pick stocks.
Some of these strategies have
gained notice in other states with 
pension problems. Last year, West
Virginia’s legislature voted to require
that public pension plans be at least 
85 percent funded before allowing
enhancements in benefits to active
employees. Additionally, benefits
improvements to retirees must now be
amortized over six years, a relatively
short time that was picked to make
sure they are paid for quickly. A recent
special appropriation added $225 mil-
lion to the public safety pension plan,
allowing it to go from 25 percent 
funded to almost 75 percent funded.
“I think the West Virginia
Legislature, at least for the last 10 years
that I’ve been here, has been very 
dedicated to funding all of our 
retirement system,” says Terasa Miller,




Ed Hustead, a former chief actuary at
the Federal Office of Personnel
Management who now works with 
Hay Group, a consulting firm in
Washington, D.C., says that his general
philosophy is to favor defined benefit
plans. But sometimes that thinking
changes, he says: “In talking to an
employer and saying, ‘Here is what a
defined benefit plan is costing in terms
of your contributions and risk and
administration expense — and oh, by
the way, the new employees don’t
appreciate it — maybe you should go
with a defined contribution plan.’”
At the same time, Hustead worries
about shifting too many employees 
to defined contribution plans. The
masses simply can’t be trusted to
responsibly plan for their retirement,
he says. “The benefit produced by a
good defined contribution plan invest-
ed wisely is still not going to be much
higher than a defined benefit plan,”
Hustead says. “And it could be a lot
lower if people don’t put as much 
in as they should or they make bad
investment decisions.” That sentiment
is shared by North Carolina Treasurer
Richard Moore, who says: “Individuals
are not very good at managing their
own money.”
The case of West Virginia’s teachers’
pension plan, the one that is today only
25 percent funded, is illustrative on
this point. When it was launched in
1941, the West Virginia teachers’ plan
was a defined contribution fund. In 
the 1960s, many retirees started 
complaining that they had run out of
retirement income, so legislators
began the conversion to a defined 
benefit plan, thinking this would offer
more protection to their retirees. But
in making the switch, legislators 
continued to fund it as a pay-as-you-go
defined contribution plan, instead of
pre-funding it with an actuarial
reserve. The result was a “systematic
accumulation of staggering unfunded
accrued liabilities,” according to the
1991 annual report of the West Virginia
Teachers Retirement System. In other
words, in trying to protect their
retirees from unwise planning, West
Virginia lawmakers ended up making
poor decisions themselves.
Converting public pensions to
defined contribution plans would
eventually take all the financial risk of
public employee retirement off a gov-
ernment’s books. But defined benefit
plans remain the norm, in no small part
— according to their managers —
because they are a great benefit. They
are guaranteed and people can’t mess
them up through dereliction or poor
choices. “You’re not leaving the
employee out there to hang,” says
NASRA’s Brainard.
But you are counting on pension
managers and policymakers to take
great care in the way they plan for the
future, even though they probably will
be long gone when the decisions they
make begin to show results. In some
cases, this has worked well. In other
cases, like in West Virginia, it hasn’t.
No system is risk-free. And for many,
the choice between defined benefit
and defined contribution plans comes
down to a simple question: Who do
you believe will do a better job 
planning for retirement — the employer
or the employee? RF
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